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Abstract 
This article delineates a framework for judging the usefulness of collaborative strategy 
in the nonprofit/nongovernmental sector. Popular among academicians as well as grant 
makers, collaboration among nonprofit organizations is often proposed as the dominant 
strategy for curing many of the sector's resource problems. However, competition is 
also prevalent in the nonprofit sector, as free entry encourages the nonprofit 
entrepreneur to form a new nonprofit to meet a perceived community need. Ignoring 
the influence of competitive forces while promoting preferred collaborative strategies 
can lead to recommendations for the third sector that are ambitious and well­
intentioned, yet impractical. Primarily theoretical in scope, this article is intended to 
inform grant makers and those at the policy making level how to determine the best 
situations to encourage collaboration in the sector, and when, surprisingly, to favor 
single-organization grant making. 
-
Introduction 
� The scholarly literature calls for greater collaboration among nonprofit organizations to 
achieve outcomes that would not be attainable if each organization works in isolation. 
Foundations, too, see duplicative effort in the nonprofit sector and often encourage grant 
seekers to collaborate with other organizations in their community (Golden 2001). 
Unfortunately, nonprofit organizations themselves seem reluctant to engage in 
collaborative efforts, unless motivated to do so with external funding from grant makers 
(Knickmeyer, Hopkins and Meyer 2003, National Council on Aging 2005, Foster and 
Meinhard 2002, Schambra 2004). 
To illustrate, the following is a community situation that seems quite dysfunctional. 
Knickmeyer, Hopkins and Meyer (2003) describe a study of ten urban neighborhood 
associations in close proximity to one another: 
" ... all ten associations are struggling to address the same community issues with a 
small number of active members. There is no evidence of joining forces with each 
other to resolve their common problems ... even when members of community 
associations recognize the value of collaboration and express interest in 
collaborating with others, they have difficulty translating that desire into actual 
collaborative projects." 
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Why are they not collaborating? Do the stakeholders in the ten neighborhood 
associations not see the potential benefits in joining forces? We will return later to the 
puzzle with two solutions depending upon the reader's point of view. We will see that 
there is little reason for the ten associations to collaborate, yet we will also point out one 
potential arena where joint efforts could indeed yield returns for all associations -
returns that could exceed the costs of collaborating. Before returning to the 
neighborhood associations case, however, we outline the theory behind decisions 
whether or not to collaborate - a task that requires first exploring the nature of 
competition in the nonprofit sector. 
Government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and for-profit businesses are all involved 
in providing solutions to vexing societal problems. In many situations, collaboration 
within and across sectors can result in solutions that are unattainable from each entity 
working alone (Irvin 2007). Even though most nonprofit executive directors will point 
to their organization's unique ability to serve a societal need, some nonprofits may 
duplicate each other's missions, which suggests keen competition in the marketplace. 
However, even if organizations do not have duplicative missions, they still face 
competition in the fund raising, human resources, and media arenas. 
Although this chapter will focus on collaboration and competition within the nonprofit 
sector, note that literature such as Austin (2000), Smith and Lipsky (1993), Smith and 
Gr0nbjerg (2006), Galaskiewicz and Colman (2006), and Boris and Steuerle (1999) are 
excellent resources for studying relationships between nonprofits, governments, and 
businesses. 
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Collaboration and Competition with Government Entities. Governments rely heavily 
on nonprofit organizations to carry out programs that benefit the public, from services 
for disadvantaged populations to civic beautification projects. Although subcontracting 
can be considered mere "quasi-collaboration", as it involves formal structures such as 
contracts, grants, monitoring and reporting of nonprofit outcomes, the transfer of funds 
from the government to the nonprofit does not entirely negate the collaborative nature 
of the project. A more obscure topic is nonprofit-government competition. This may 
occur when a government agency is required to submit a bid in order to obtain tax­
supported funding to produce services. In the education field, government schools 
compete directly with private nonprofit schools for funds if tax revenue for education 
follows the student. For the most part, however, nonprofit organizations provide 
complementary services to government services, with nonprofits frequently on the 
receiving end of collaborative agreements to carry out government initiatives. 
Collaboration and Competition with For-Profit Firms. Presumably, the nonprofit and 
for-profit sectors do not intertwine, as their motivations for formation - profit vs. 
provision of a public good - differ radically. In practice, however, collaboration across 
the two sectors is commonplace. Businesses benefit from participating in community 
betterment, whether for marketing purposes, for improving the skills or availability of 
future employees, or for benefitting and retaining their current employees (Cordes and 
Steuerle 2009). Thus, businesses are eager partners with nonprofit organizations. 
Businesses also volunteer their facilities, products or services (or provide discounts) for 
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nonprofits, for a wide variety of tasks where professional products and services are 
needed. 
Competition, on the other hand, is also prevalent if the nonprofit organizations and for­
profit firms produce similar services. Nonprofit and for-profit health care facilities of all 
types and fitness-oriented organizations (such as YMCA) come to mind. In these arenas, 
the for-profit firms protest the granting of tax exemption to nonprofits, while the 
nonprofits counter by measuring and reporting their uncompensated benefits provided 
to the community (see Brown's chapter in this volume for a discussion of for-profit and 
nonprofit coexistence). Note that in past decades, the public policy debate focused on 
how for-profits compete with nonprofits, but the debate has shifted to a focus on 
partnerships between the two sectors (Steinberg 1987; Marmor, Schlesinger and Smithey 
1987; Austin 2000; Cordes and Steuerle 2009). 
�easures of industry concentration exist, such as the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, to 
determm how much market share competing nonprofit organizations and for-profi 
rket. Collaboration may be harder to measure, bu 
that measuring social netw_)>I'l< ·es (see Wasserman and 
Faust 1994) might approximate a measu or c9llaboration. Comparing the extent of 
competition and collaboration in a somrnunity or m,<'N<P 
analysis differ. On a pu�ely conjectural basis, therefore, I would hy 
nonprofit - government and nonprofit - business relationships are more often 
collaborative than competitive, with a few sub-sectoral exceptions. I leave it up to the 
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reader, however, to surmise whi& is the dominant nonprofit - nonprofit activity. Do 
I nonprofits compete with each· other more often, or collaborate? 
Competition in the Nonprofit Sector 
Here, we examine the classical model of profit maximization under conditions of perfect 
competition and find it to be of limited use - on the surface - yet extraordinarily 
powerful if we stretch the definitional boundaries of the model. Profit maximization is a 
defining feature of the for-profit sector. �le first and obvious corollary for the 
nonprofit sector is when organizations are selling a product for which they can charge a 
price, such as admission, fees for services, or prices for a tangible product. In addition to 
the arena of products and services, there are several additional ways in which nonprofits 
compete - for donated revenues, inputs such as labor, grants, and even for media 
coverage. 
Competition for Clients When Revenue is Generated from Prices 
Three large nonprofit subsectors - health, human services, and private education -
usually derive the majority of their revenues from sales of a service to clients. Other 
organizations, such as performing and visual arts organizations, serve audience 
members who pay for the right to enter a museum or enjoy a performance. In these 
cases, the quest for operating revenue closely follows the profit maximization model. 
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Because the product or service can be priced and the price can be charged to a client who 
is willing to pay, there is no reason to expect that for-profit firms won't also enter the 
market and produce this product. Accordingly, we see plenty of for-profit health care 
providers, day cares and human services providers. In the broad context of 
entertainment we see for-profit entities supplying the market with music concerts and 
movies, both of which compete for audience members with nonprofits. Nonprofit and 
for-profit cultural institutions, however, tend to self-sort according to the artistic genre 
of the entertainment. 
Oster (chapter 13) notes that even donative nonprofits - those primarily dependent upon 
donated and not fee-based revenues - also participate in a competitive fee-based 
product market as a way of cross-subsidizing the core mission product, for which a price 
may be difficult to charge. Indeed, the complicated revenue mix in the nonprofit sector 
from donations, grants, endowment income and fee-based products requires a strategic 
and precarious balance of mission-related goals, crowding-out effects from one revenue 
source to another, and overall financial viability. Oster' s chapter explores product 
diversification in more depth, but briefly stated, the existence of for-profit competitors 
suggests that the predicted long run market equilibrium for commercial nonprofit 
organizations or at least organizations with fee-based products is likely to follow the 
perfect competition model: Organizations will compete for clients, innovating and 
reducing costs wherever possible, arriving at a long run state where profits are zero 
(covering only their opportunity costs) and resources are provided at a quantity level 
that minimizes average costs of production. Furthermore, consumers (clients) enjoy the 
maxi.mum benefits that this market can possibly offer. 
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Evidence suggests that the perfect competition model does indeed hold some 
explanatory power for behavior of nonprofit organizations. The well-developed health 
care literature indicates that increased competition in health care markets is a causal 
factor in lower prices for health services (Melnick and Zwanziger 1988). Certainly, we 
see evidence of nonprofits existing on a razor-thin profit margin over time, but this is 
not a condition limited necessarily to nonprofits with fee-based revenues - organizations 
more reliant on donor funding also exhibit this zero-profit condition in the long run, but 
for reasons other than direct competition (such as expanding services whenever profit is 
above normal). 
Expanding services whenever a modicum of profit exists implies not profit 
maximization, but service maximization. Thus, a nonprofit may use competitive 
strategies such as entrepreneurial sorting to maximize outcomes, not profits (Steinberg's 
objective function article or Luksetich). A mix of objectives can be utilized to suit the 
overall mission with a multi-product organization. For example, profits from one 
service (competition model) might be used to cross-subsidize the production of other 
services that are not financially viable on their own (service maximization model). 
Surely Luksetich talks about this? 
Competition may come in the form of innovating in order to produce the product or 
service with lower costs, or differentiating the product in a tangible (changing service 
attributes) or intangible (advertising) way. Differentiating the product can result in a 
crowded market, each nonprofit with its own very small market niche or identity. 
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Fortunately, the nonprofit with the unique identity has market demand all to itself - yet 
a very weak and small market demand. Each organization sees itself as a unique 
organization with a unique mission. Nonprofits do not only vary the features of their 
product or service to establish their public benefit role, but they can also distinguish 
themselves by varying the methods by which they accomplish their missions . . .  in 
essence, the mission itself, the outcomes they produce, and even the production methods 
they use can be differentiated in order to carve out a unique identity that appeals to 
funders (Brown and Slivinski 2006). 
Can the demand for nonprofit services be segmented that much and the market still be 
"efficient?" Theories of monopolistic competition suggest otherwise. Figure 1 illustrates 
the long run results of a segmented market - each nonprofit with its own very small 
market demand and profits, once again, at zero. The difference between price 
competition and product differentiation in long run competition, however, is that 
product (or mission) differentiation leads to a long run equilibrium at output level Q*, an 
inefficiently high-cost level of production. Price competition without product 
differentiation, on the other hand, would have led to an equilibrium output level of QE, 
where average costs per item are at their minimum possible level. 
Figure 1: Monopolistic Competition Equilibrium 
(insert Figure 1 here) 
Competition for Donations 
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· For many nonprofit organizations, it may be impossible to charge a price for the services 
rendered. The recipient of charity may be unable to pay. Or, the nonprofit may be 
unable to charge a price for the service, no matter how much people are willing to pay 
(advocacy organizations come to mind). Donations comprise a vital source of revenue 
for these types of nonprofits, and competition for donations has grown fiercely over the 
past few decades. The sharp growth of nonprofit organizations has resulted in an 
environment of year-round fund raising by trained professionals. One good fund 
raising idea is copied widely by other nonprofits, as illustrated by the "what will they 
think of next" worlds of direct mail and special events. 
Borrowing theory from the perfectly competitive fee-based model, and using the 
assumption that nonprofits will compete by increasing their fund raising efforts, we end 
up at equilibrium where net revenues from fund raising are competed away for all, with 
all nonprofits making zero profit in the end. Fund raising costs can be thought of as 
similar to marketing costs - they add to a nonprofit' s fixed costs, yet carry the risk of not 
resulting in a higher demand for the charitable activity. Figure 2 shows average costs 
before and after a marketing or fund raising campaign (see Seaman 2004, Brown and 
Slivinski 2006). The nonprofit engaging in this costly effort hopes to end up with 
substantially more donated funds which will offset the increase in costs at each level of 
output. �. 
J,,a 11.1..i '-\.t) ( w\\, t \,\. AL<, u. l h, ·; (\ fJ\ 1,'"\..(_ 
Figure 2: Increased Average Costs of Fund Raising 
(insert Figure 2 here) 
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Competition for Paid Staff and Volunteers 
The nonprofit sector is a service industry, so labor comprises a large portion of its 
required inputs, from teachers to nature hike leaders, musicians and counselors, to name 
a few. A volunteer workforce augments the nonprofit labor pool for lower-skilled work. 
Nonprofit executive salaries, though nowhere as stratospheric as U.S. salaries for upper-
level executives in large firms, have increased sharply over the last decade in the 
nonprofit sector (Barton, Di Mento and Sanoff 2006), suggesting some upward bidding 
for leadership talent as a generation of long-time leaders pass the administrative reins to 
succeeding executive directors. If an organization is constrained to keep salaries modest !Y-t-� 
(to signal frugality and dedication to the mission), the competition to hire executive � c, � l P 
talent is that much more fierce, and may play out by compensation via non-monetary 
perquisites. 
Competition for volunteers cannot be salary-based, however, by definition. The 
mobilizer of human endeavor - the underappredated volunteer administrator - attracts 
a dedicated volunteer pool using superior leadership and organizational skills (not to 
mention an attractive mission). Good volunteers who come regularly, stay with the 
organization over time and perform valuable services are important and scarce assets for 
nonprofits. Nonprofits, facing a decline in the number of long-term volunteers, have 
begun to accommodate "episodic" volunteers with short-term projects (Macduff 2005). 
Thus, competition for volunteer labor rests not on salary, but on managerial strategies 
for luring and retaining valuable volunteers. Hager and Brudney (2004) provide an 
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interesting review of retention strategies used by nonprofits, finding that the strategies 
most effective in retaining volunteers (volunteer recognition, professional development 
and training for volunteers, etc.) benefit the volunteers themselve�t necessarily the 
nonpronG suggesting managerial tradeoffs between pleasing the volunteer and 
benefitting the organization. 
Competition for Grants and Contracts 
The struggle to obtain government contracts and grants from foundations is a 
fascinating researcher's laboratory, yet little theoretical and empirical attention has 
focused on this revenue strategy. Effort is poured into grant applications for very little 
return. In the U.S., we still see grants for as low as $500, in seeil'll!1g disregard of the 
time required to prepare the grant application. We also see nonprofits applying for 
government contracts that pay only partial costs - perhaps the nonprofit is just grateful 
for the subsidy of their services, which they would endeavor to provide even without 
the government contract. Smith and Lipsky (1993, p. 161) note, "Many contracts, 
especially in today's strained budgetary climate, allocate insufficient money for 
administrative expenses .... In the worst-case scenario, an agency will obtain a new but 
substantially underfunded contract. .. and the agency loses money from the day it 
assumes the contract." Toepler (chapter 23) notes that inadequate coverage of costs from 
government grants suggests a private sector subsidy of government objectives. 
With insufficient funds to actually complete the project, nonprofits may be treating the 
underfunded yet successful grant as a first step to obtaining more remunerative funding 
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in the next grant cycle. Some empirical attention by researchers might help the sector 
achieve somewhat more efficient outcomes with grants and contracts. Nonprofits, 
competing against many other worthy nonprofits, appear to be in a bidding war, 
promising much and pricing their services low in an effort to win the grant or contract. 
Competition for Media Coverage 
For the nonprofit organizations whose mission involves educating the public on any 
topic, media coverage of their efforts is critical to their success. Even nonprofits without 
advocacy-based missions clamor for media coverage to gain legitimacy in the public's 
mind for their mission and to attract new supporters, donors, and volunteers. "Free" 
media coverage - such as a laudatory report in the morning newspaper - is not 
necessarily free, but involves labor costs such as being available for media inquiries, 
contacting media representatives on a regular basis with press releases, and devising 
media-friendly angles in special events. Two reasons for nonprofit competition for 
"free" media coverage are: The relative lack of spendable income in organizations 
dependent on donations and grants, and expectations by the public that nonprofits 
refrain from "slick" paid advertising (Pallotta 2009), presumably to appear efficient and 
frugal stewards of the donated dollar. 
Collaboration in the Nonprofit Sector 
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Although it is easy to talk about the importance of collaboration, it is difficult to define 
exactly what characterizes a "somewhat'' or "very" collaborative project. Yankey and 
Willen (2005) provide several examples of collaboration matrices. Confounding the 
discussion, of course, is the differing nature of collaboration across the nonprofit, 
business, and government sectors. Figure 3 shows a simple collaboration matrix with 
common sector participants. Placement of particular arrangements on the continuum 
may be uncertain. For example, is "contracting" a simple exchange of funding for 
services, or is it more like a collaboration? 
Figure 3: A Sample Continuum of Collaboration 
Degree of 
Partnership Partners Description 
Minimal 
! 
Moderate 
NP, F-P, Govt. Contracting, grants for services produced by nonprofits 
NP, F-P 
NP 
F-P 
NP, Govl 
Cause marketing 
Non-monetized trading (bartering of services) 
Sponsorship of nonprofit events 
Jointly produced events 
NP Joint purchasing and cost-sharing 
NP Associations of professionals; information and training 
networks 
! NP, F-P, Govt. Community dialogue, information sharing, advocacy 
NP, F-P, Govt. Community initiatives, designing and implementing solutions 
Extensive NP Integration of operations, merger 
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Where is the Value in Collaboration? 
Funders may assume that more collaboration in the nonprofit sector automatically 
implies mutual benefits, plus benefits for external publics as well. However, parsing the 
value of collaboration into broad categories helps to illuminate the truly important 
contributions from collaboration that should be pursued by nonprofits and encouraged 
by funders. Pivotal to this discussion is the relationships among participating nonprofit 
organizations. Do they compete in the same local market? Or are they peers, producing 
the same service but in different markets? Do they produce services that are entirely 
unrelated? 
Benefits to Sharing Information 
For peer organizations - nonprofits producing the same good, but for different groups of 
people or in different geographical locations - mutual benefit can come from 
associational membership and their concomitant learning opportunities. In fact, these 
types of associations spring up voluntarily in every field, from museums to health care 
providers. Gaining knowledge in an association is attractive to the neophytes in the 
field, but less so for seasoned professionals from well-established organizations. Thus, 
conferences of associated organizations often end up paying or hosting the leaders of the 
field to serve as instructors for the newcomers. 
In addition, certain functional areas common to most nonprofits - such as fund raising 
or volunteer management - can benefit from associational collaboration. Across local, 
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national, and international boundaries, fellow practitioners of fund raising, for example, 
meet to learn best practices in their field, regardless of their nonprofit sub-sector. Both 
of these information sharing initiatives - among peers in separate geographic markets or  
among professional peers in unrelated agencies - require little or no stimulus from 
external funders for collaborative efforts to arise. 
Another way to enhance revenue streams is to coordinate with agencies that perform 
different services, but are in the position to refer clients to each other - such as in social 
services organizations. A substance abuse counseling agency might benefit from a 
collegial relationship with a homeless and transitional housing organization. Note that 
sharing information about client needs and trading best practices tips is easily 
accomplished among organizations that are not direct competitors for clients, audience 
members, or grants. If the benefits to sharing information are obvious, nonprofits will 
quickly form associations or networks to do so. 
Cost Minimization 
Nonprofit organizations have ample opportunity to review their use of resources and 
locate lower-cost solutions by sharing.fixed costs with other organizations. Sharing 
facilities via scheduling differences (one organization uses the facility by day, another at 
night, for example) can lower facilities costs. Organizations can also share equipment, 
or personnel such as a front desk receptionist, payroll clerk, or security guard. Variable 
costs can also be reduced through alliances. Group bulk purchases of supplies and 
services can reduce the per-unit cost. Fund raising events sometimes involve multiple 
players, if the organizations bring complementary talents to the process, or if the 
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donating public is expected to respond to a joint effort with increased generosity. Group 
workshops or seminars are key ways to reduce costs of training for employees in new 
roles (Under One Roof Project 2004, McLaughlin 1998). 
The question in the back of any nonprofit manager's mind is, does the potential 
reduction in costs exceed the transactions costs of collaborating? It makes no sense to 
collaborate if the costs of meeting, working out the details, and implementing the project 
overwhelm the eventual returns to the organization. Collaboration takes time; the 
nonprofit manager's most precious commodity. 
Bartering 
Nonprofit enterprise is unique in many ways, but the prevalence of bartering is one of 
Co\lu. \o�vc... \-, v-t....--
its most distinctive features (Ben-Ner 1993, Reisman 1991). Note that the for-profit 
sector rarely engages in non-monetized trade. Why does this curious practice occur so 
of ten in the nonprofit sector? Scarcity of cash is one reason. When a business runs out 
of cash (that is, income), the owner shuts it down after a few lean years. When a 
nonprofit runs out of cash, people pitch in to accomplish the mission anyway, with 
volunteer labor, homemade tri-fold brochures, and jury-rigged equipment. This practice 
of production witl,out caslr expendihtre extends to partnerships with other organizations. 
No exchange of income is necessary if the two organizations have a mutually beneficial 
project in mind. Regarding cost minimization described above, you can envision several 
ways in which organizations reduce fixed and variable costs can occur via bartering. 
Each organization produces the product or service for which they have comparative 
advantage, creating mutual benefits to specialization and trade. 
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party may be unable to see direct benefits to their own organization, relative to the costs 
of collaborating. 
Compare three collaborative projects: 
I. Sharing a security guard with a nonprofit next door. Each organization receives 
"security" for half price by splitting the cost with the partner (note the minimal 
transactions costs). Hiring a security guard has easily measured benefits accruing to 
both parties. The decision to hire the security guard is expected to be accomplished 
readily, if both perceive that a half-price guard is a bargain. 
II. Community-wide push to combat crime associated with methamphetamine abuse. 
Organizations such as the State Patrol, substance abuse counseling centers, and high 
school health education instructors are brought together to devise solutions to meth 
addiction. This collaborative project is more difficult to accomplish. What organization 
has the spare time to send its executive director or other staff member to meetings? 
Benefits to the individual organizations are unclear, yet benefits to the broader public 
are potentially large, if the community effort is successful. Even though the 
organizations' missions suggest that they should be willing participants, direct benefits to 
the organizations are not apparent, and participation in the collaboration may depend 
on whether or not each organization receives funding to participate. 
� III. '!!!!:_ee Iacal organizations. prmiiding shelter for the homeless_ate..Yiged to collaborate 
ta_shai:_�puormation on "revolving �' clients, streamline costs of operatio_n, _.µ1d 
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wqrk together on expanding the number of beds in neighborhoods where they are most -- - -
n�d. This case is a hopeful dream for grant makers. If only these organizations 
would work together! Alas, they are natural competitors, and have strong incentives to 
protect their territory and gain funding for their own organizations. Each organization 
is likely to believe it has the better model for providing homeless services. Not only do 
we expect high transactions for bringing these participants into an alliance, but if grant 
funding is 9btained to do so, much energy may be spent on carefully defining the 
activities and required contributions from each player. 
The three scenarios illustrate when collaboration will be somewhat or very difficult to 
achieve. Much of the academic and trade literature on collaboration focuses on the 
processes undertaken in collaborative efforts, without noticing that it is the nature of the 
players that can make the process easy or difficult. Essentially, if the potential 
collaborators are not direct competitors and the gains to collaboration are obvious and 
do not involve high transactions costs, then we expect collaboration to occur readily. 
Conversely, if the potential collaborators are direct competitors (which implies they 
have similar missions!), we expect spontaneous collaboration to occur only rarely, when 
benefits to each organization are direct and easily measured. Even with grant funding 
to stimulate a cooperative project, collaboration among competitors may involve 
awkward maneuvering over htrf and authority. 
What about the ten uncooperative neighborhood associations described at the beginning 
of the chapter? It is no surprise that they lack the desire to cooperate - their identical 
missions suggest that they are competitors for the same pool of grant funding from the 
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city or from foundations. Unfortunately, it is not very realistic to expect the 
neighborhood associations to collaborate, even though they address the same 
community issues. 
Could we do better? Assume we have a foundation funder that is very committed to 
collaboration. Considering the problems the neighborhood associations face - drug 
dealing, trash, and vacant housing - we see that some of their most pressing issues could 
be tackled with better law enforcement practices, more frequent trash collection, strict 
enforcement of housing code violations, and so on. More effective external advocacy is 
needed - the kind of advocacy that requires a multitude of constituents voicing a 
common concern and pressing for the same solution. Shaping the external environment, 
therefore, is the outcome we should target for a grant-funded collaborative effort in this 
case. That is, strategic grant making in this case should not be broadly defined as any 
collaborative undertaking, but instead focus on helping the neighborhood organizations 
advocate as one organization for changes in local housing, trash collection, and law 
enforcement. 
Grant Making Policy and Practice Recommendations 
�i-1"-"'1'\.u-\-.J-
Where benefits to collaboration are obvious, nonprofits will pursue collaborative 
projects readily. Where collaboration's benefits to the organization are unclear or 
indirect, nonprofits may avoid the partnership, as the collaboration is seen as too costly 
to devote scarce organizational resources to. Foundations, however, provide the 
21 
external impetus for many collaborative efforts, despite the conflicting incentives or 
nebulous benefits for the nonprofits themselves. Although Schambra (2004) laments 
that inducing coordination among separate agencies is costly and futile, perhaps with an 
awareness of competitive incentives within the nonprofit sectors, grant makers can 
achieve some headway. This chapter ends, therefore, with a focus on grant maker 
decision making, and a call for more precise evaluation of collaborative projects in a 
competitive nonprofit environment. 
Grant makers must seek out the projects that are most likely to align organizational 
incentives with intended outcomes. In theory, collaborative grant making to non­
competing organizations will have the best chance of success, as the partners are more 
willing to trade services and combine efforts when they identify as community allies. 
Grants to groups of competing organizations are far more difficult to design 
successfully. Grant makers view the burgeoning number of nonprofits with some 
dismay, citing the rapid sector growth as evidence of duplication, and hoping that the 
nonprofits in similar fields can learn to work together for the common good. As Golden 
(2001, 672) notes " . . .  many grantmakers currently prefer to support collaborative efforts 
rather than single-organization projects. These funders maintain that collaboration is 
generally more efficient and more· cost effective than single-organization efforts, because 
costly duplication of effqrt is avoided." Unfortunately, precisely where there is 
"duplication of effort", we expect collaboration to be least likely to occur, even with 
financial inducement from funders. 
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Providing grant funding for competing organizations may still yield successful 
outcomes if the collaborative project is sharply targeted toward activities that benefit the 
nonprofit participants directly. A good example is the advocacy training grant to the 
neighborhood associations. The gains to the organizations could be significant if they 
unite their voices and expertly pressure the city to adapt new practices in combating 
crime or targeting housing vacancy. Pinpointing these rare but advantageous 
opportunities to bring competitors together is likewise extraordinarily time-consuming, 
requiring keen analytical skills on the part of the grant maker. Conversely, a grant with 
J G� 
hopeful but vague collaborative outeomes such as "improve capacity by building 
networks across neighborhood associations" is not likely to yield much more than 
minutes from meetings. 
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